Of the 14 British FEPoWs named (above) who lost their lives, six did mot receive posthumous recognition. For all intents and purposes, the risks confronted by these men must have been identical, thus the singling out of just one man for a posthumous MID from two of the groups has to be seen as an extremely illogical and petty act on the part of the British War Office.

In direct contrast, Canadian military authorities showed no such reluctance when recognising four of their soldiers who attempted to escape from Hong Kong. As with Australian military authorities, their Canadian counterparts would have been empowered to process and confer these awards. They were duly gazetted in February 1948.

The British decision of 1952 to draw a bottom line on further honours and awards for gallant service in WW2 would effectively make it well-nigh impossible mow for the six men to receive retrospective recognition. Nevertheless, for their undoubted devotion to duty and gallant sacrifice in the most extreme of circumstances, their next of kin deserve at least some form of explanation - no matter how belated this might be - of why they were overlooked for recognition. (As happened with the Australians, it's more than likely the next-of-kin were never informed in the postwar period why their loved ones were passed over for recognition.)

2006

2006 was noteworthy for three items of correspondence being received; two were from Defence Ministers Robert Hill (signed-off on pretty well his last day at the office) and Dr Brendan Nelson. Sandwiched in between was the third, from Veterans'Affairs Minister, Bruce Billson.

Inter alia, Robert Hill's correspondence claimed that since British awards could no longer be given for WW2 service, the Australian government was 'not in a position to advance the matter any further'. Having previously provided reasons and quoted precedents why present-day Australian gallantry awards - not British awards - could be conferred, I was not over impressed with the advice given to Hill by his department.

But having rebutted this and other Defence arguments in mid-February 2006, the issue was shuffled over to Veterans' Affairs whose eventual response offered nothing new.

Finally in November 2006, Defence claimed I had 'never tendered any documentation to prove (my) claims that all PoWs killed as a result of attempting to escape would be automatically awarded the MID'.

Once again my 2002 use of 'automatic' was coming back to haunt me.

Defence's statement came as something of a surprise because just a few months earlier, Prime Minister's and Cabinet Office had requested I forward all necessary documents that would support the existence of the posthumous MID policy. I had complied with this request by sending copies of not only the two files located in 2002, but also a file directly associated with the November 1943 decision. Of course, there was no mention of the word 'automatic' in any of the files I forwarded, but from where I stood it seemed to me Defence and I were now reduced to arguing at cross purposes - very much an exercise of playing with words.

So, if not 'automatic', just what conditions needed to be satisfied in order for these awards to be conferred? In February 1944, the UK-based Imperial PoW Committee informed the Defence Committee in Australia of their November 1943 decision, and set out just two guidelines that needed to be followed:

However, there was an additional caveat, or if you will, an 'out':

By June 1945, of the 22 Australians FEPoWs known to have suffered this fate, only in one instance was there some doubt expressed as to the genuineness of the escape attempt. One year or so later - save for Breavington - none of this mattered. Nobody else was posthumously recognised. So much for the 'uniform system'. Clearly, even though Australian military authorities would have been well aware of how the policy was being administered in relation to Army and Air Force personnel in Europe, they had presumably fallen back on the 'sole discretion' clause to absolve themselves from taking any positive action. What could have caused them to be so uncharitable?

Unfortunately, the precise reason for this mysterious about-turn by our military authorities in the postwar years is unlikely to be satisfactorily resolved. The National Archives trail goes cold after January 1946, and one can only speculate on what might have occurred. One possibility is that the change of heart might have had something to do with the tragic Sandakan death march where, from an initial 1787 Australian and 641 British FEPoWs, only six Australians successfully escaped and survived. Yet, of the six, only one, WO Bill Sticpewich, received an MBE; there was no recognition in the form of the British Empire Medal (BEM) for the other five - the most common award for those, other than officers, who succeeded in escaping from the enemy. However, the absence of any paperwork covering possible awards for the six men who escaped, and Cleary and Crease who were executed, again makes it is extremely unlikely if anything could now be done to honour these five men.

During the Sandakan marches there must have been many men who took their chance to escape and failed. Faced with this, perhaps it all became just too difficult for our authorities to differentiate between what was seen as a genuine attempt and one that was not. But if indeed such were the case, that was still no reason to deny the claims of those whose attempts at escape had been assessed as genuine in June 1945. If ever there was a case of 'throwing the baby out with the bath water' this had to be it.

2007

There was further correspondence from Defence in March 2007 which harked back to previous 'detailed explanations' of my claims and which presented the all-too familiar argument on why British/Imperial awards could not be given.

My evidence had been reviewed within both the Directorate of Honours and Awards and the Awards and Culture Branch of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and their conclusion was that the documents I had supplied did not support my contention - they merely indicated that it was British Government policy that all escaped and executed PoWs could be regarded as eligible for consideration for the Mentioned in Despatches, and that Australia could consider doing similarly. However, Defence considered that the term "eligible for consideration" was important here. It indicated that there was a discretion to be exercised with the policy, and no automatic entitlement accrued. There was no evidence that the Australian Defence Committee (ADC) agreed to this policy for Australia. Defence concluded that the document I had supplied concerning the award to a Royal Marine, supported the position that each instance was considered on its own merits.

I found the logic of Defence's arguments quite extraordinary. Quite apart from raising the old chestnut of 'automatic', would it really have been the case that the ADC would not agree to this policy 'for Australia' when the British War office and Air Ministry had already processed and gazetted 15 posthumous MIDs to Australians serving in the European theatre - awards which had subsequently appeared in the Commonwealth Gazette? And if it were really true that each instance was considered on its own merits, how could the ADC have possibly ignored poor Gale's claims for posthumous recognition, let alone those for the 'Tavoy 8'?

The Rudd Labor Government was duly elected, so one must naturally hope that after having been overlooked for so long, the men - and their next of kin - will finally receive the justice and recognition their sacrifices deserved all those years ago.

2008

While 2008 did not present much opportunity to advance the case for retrospective recognition, it certainly did not turn out to be a year for marking time.

I had been fortunate enough to receive financial assistance from the Darwin City Council to conduct further research into what I had good reason to believe were myths and misinformation associated with the bombing of Darwin. These concerns primarily related to various aspects of the first raid on 19 February 1942, but also covered aspects of censorship and newspaper reports over the period March 1942 - November 1943.

However, two external events occurred which I thought would later prove of great assistance when it came the time to develop and publicise arguments for retrospective military honours and awards.

The first, in March 2008, was the publication of a report by the three-man Long Tan Review Committee, who had assessed their assigned role as being 'to examine the documentary evidence available, consider the nature and context of the battle and the process that followed concerning individual and collective recognition, and seek to arrive at a fair and sustainable response to claims for further recognition.'

The report, 'Review of Recognition for the Battle of Long Tan', stipulated seven principles, or guidelines, of which I reckoned four would be appropriate in any future determination of retrospective gallantry awards and, of the four, two were particularly relevant to the line of argument I proposed to follow should the opportunity arise to appear before the Tribunal. They were:

Principle 2

Any decisions by the Panel to recommend further recognition must be based on official records or other compelling evidence, and

Principle 3

To maintain the integrity of the system of honours and awards the Panel reaffirms its respect for the protocols of the operational awards system. Decisions to recommend new or higher awards will only be made where a clear anomaly or manifest injustice (my emphasis) can be established. In cases where the Imperial system did not provide recognition but where the Panel believes recognition is warranted, it should be made under the Australian system.

The second development occurred in May 2008 when the new government initiated its election promise to create an independent Honours and Awards Tribunal. Advertisements appeared in the national press seeking applications from suitably qualified personnel for the positions of Tribunal Chairperson and seven members - subsequently increased to ten.

On 23 July 2008, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support, the Hon. Dr. Mike Kelly AM MP, announced the appointment of the inaugural Chairperson, Emeritus Professor Dennis Pearce AO, and ten members of the independent Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal.

Following the establishment of the Tribunal I had had some correspondence with Defence, questioning what priority - relative to what other matters might be coming before the Tribunal - the FEPoW issue should be given, However, the best advice I received was that the matter was unlikely to be addressed by the Tribunal before 2009.

2009

Early in 2009 the Tribunal requested me to forward any archival material I possessed. This set the ball rolling and formed the basis of the formal, written submission which was eventually presented to the Tribunal on 23 July. The positive outcome was that I was invited to come to Canberra in early September and be interviewed by two members of the Tribunal. However, since my wife and I were due to be flying to the UK two days after the proposed date, I requested a postponement until such time as we had returned to Australia. This was granted, and I eventually appeared before the Tribunal on 27 October.

I recall asking at this meeting how long it might be before I could expect to receive a decision from the Tribunal? The general expectation was that they hoped to conduct their own research, arrive at a decision and write their report sometime within the February-March 2010 timescale.

2010

As I was to find out later, the Tribunal's report was actually presented to Defence in April 2010 but this was not, by any means, the end of the story, its public release would be governed by the time it took for the Department to assess, and then finally accept, the Tribunal'a recommendations. Unfortunately this process had not been completed before the political mayhem in June had led to Julia Gillard replacing Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister. The delay in getting the report accepted was further aggravated by the Government deciding to call a Federal election for 21 August. This meant that general government business would have to be put on hold as the parliamentary system entered its so-called 'caretaker' period. But when the election result became just too close to call, release of the Tribunal's decision was, inevitably, once again postponed. A group of independent members held the balance of power and had the responsibility of deciding which party should take over the reins of government. It was not until 7 September that two Independent members, by giving their support to the previous government, enabled the Labor Party to finally stagger over the line.

Once returned to office, the government took the opportunity to initiate a series of ministerial reshuffles, one involved Senator the Hon. David Feeney who,as Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, replaced Mike Kelly. This occasioned yet another delay since no decision or announcement by Defence could be made until Senator Feeney had been fully briefed on current matters before the Tribunal.

In 19 November correspondence to Senator Feeney I expressed concern about the likelihood of no decision being forthcoming until the New Year. This must have done the trick, for within a week I had been informed. in confidence. that the Tribunal's decision would favour of most of the men concerned receiving retrospective recognition.

2011

On 11 February, the report finally went public on the Tribunal's website, followed on 6 March by Senator Feeney's media release which called on the next of kin of those honoured to come forward and receive the Commendation for Gallantry. The media release read:

This page last updated: April 2011